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Abstract
The United States Senate is one of the major legislating forces in the United States and
can make policy impacts that can have significant impacts for the entire nation . The two major
political parties in the U.S . have significant influence on the members of this body , yet they are
elected to represent each of the different states. Previous research has shown that states and
districts can vary significantly in their political leanings and preferences , even from the party that
is considered the majority in that area. The purpose of this study is to investigate several forces
that may influence members' of the U.S. Senate voting patterns - specifically how frequently
they vote with their party. The main variables in question are the individual state ideology and
the state ideological heterogeneity , or how diverse the ideological viewpoints are of those in each
state. Other factors used in this analysis are the ideology and ideological heterogeneity of each of
the major political parties in the state, the previous election margins of victory for incumbent
Senators , and leadership positions of the Senators . Over the course of this research, it was found
that there are major differences between the two parties in how they respond to each of these
variables . Republicans were more responsive to increases in homogeneity among their
constituents . Democrats didn't seem to respond at all. Both parties did vote more frequently with
their parties as they became ideologically extreme. Overall , this study has important implications
for how individuals are represented by their elected officials, how changing political
demographics may affect representation , and it gives greater insight into how U.S. Senators
choose to balance competing interests.
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The 2010 Alaskan Senate Election was certainly momentous , to say nothing of its
historical implications. Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, had been appointed to be
Senator by her father in 2002 , and won reelection in 2004. But during the Tea Party
upheaval of the Republican Party in 2010, Murkowski was defeated in her primary
election to Joe Miller , who was backed by the current Governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin .
She was one of several incumbent Senators to lose their primary to Tea Party candidates .
However , for Murkowski the fight did not end there . She decided to run as a write-in,
independent candidate, and barnstormed the state, giving bracelets out to constituents so
they could remember how to spell her name. While Alaskan politics are unique , the
results were meteoric. Murkowski cjefeated Miller , the Republican nominee who was
expected to win, as well as the Democratic nominee Scott McAdams. She was the first
individual to win a Senate seat by write-in in 50 years , and the first-ever incumbent
Senator to win their seat back by write-in election . While elections like this are very rare ,
there are important features of this election that made the circumstances and outcome
possible ; examining some of them will help current Senatorial elections and voting
patterns become more understandable and hopefully provide insight into this elected
body.
First of all, it should be noted that the political climate was right for incumbents to
lose reelection in primary elections , particularly incumbents who were considered
"moderates." But Alaska itself has some unique features that made such a dramatic
election possible. Some of these features have to do with the homogeneity of the ideology
of the citizens of the state , or the diversity of political views among the constituencies
being represented, as well as the extremity of those views . In Alaska , the Republican
Party is slightly more extreme than the average Republican Party in each state , and is one
of the most heterogeneous . Murkowski , a political moderate , facing reelection in a party
that is diverse , but slightly more extreme than most Republican parties, and riding the
national Tea Party wave put her in a very vulnerable position. The fact that the popular
sitting governor Sarah Palin , a Tea Party Darling and dynastic figure in Alaskan politics ,
backed Joe Miller only added to Murkowski's woes. Miller narrowly defeated
Murkowski , with 51 % of the vote. Following this close primary election, Senator
Murkowski made the decision to run as an independent write-in candidate in the general
election. Alaska is a moderate state that leans conservative and typically votes
Republican in major elections . However, when you look at the ideological heterogeneity
of the viewpoints in Alaska as a whole, they actually tend to be one of the most
politically diverse states in the nation . This is not a political climate that is very
welcoming to partisan extremists - the likes of Joe Miller - in a general election , because
on average the public does not reach consensus very frequently, and there is obviously a
strong coalition of dissen ting voices from the opposing party. This unique electoral
environment, combined with name recognition, and major election spending helped
propel Murkowski to victory in the general election in 2010.
While there are many reasons that this remarkable election occurred , and this
story may appear anecdotal , electoral attitudes of the voting population are significant,
and likely played a major role in this election . Those we elect to public office are often
strongly motivated by reelection, and uµderstanding how the public perceives them may
influence how they choose to represent the public. Representation is a major topic of
study by political scientists, and by understanding how constituency ideology and
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diversity influences that, we can gain greater insight into how our elected officials are
influenced by those factors.
The United States has several representative bodies , one of which is the Senate.
The U.S. Senate is a unique governing institution for several reasons, including the
independence of the members due to their longer terms , and the influence given to each
of them by Senate rules , among other things. However , the members are still charged
with representing constituents in their states , and most belong to political parties based on
their ideological views and policy goals . The states they represent are themsel ves very
unique , and the constituents ' views vary greatly state to state , even if party affiliation is
the same, and there is significant ideological variation within the state (Levendusky and
Pope 2010). Not only must legislators gain an understanding of their constituents '
political preferences, but also legislators face other pressures , the most commanding
coming from their political party. Parties are nearly essential for election to major
political office , and play major administrative roles in the Senate. Senators rely on the
party for resources required for election , and the party needs the Senators to help them
make their desired policies law.
We have already seen that elected officials can face difficult demands from their
constituents that they are charged with representing . They also must balance demands
from the political party that often provides basic support , and many have an unclear idea
of what it means to be a representative In this study , I will work to unravel how elected
officials make decisions in their roles by studying how ideological heterogeneity in states
influences party loyalty in the United States Senate. To begin , I will examine literature
regarding representation , ideological heterogeneity , and party loyalty in Congress.
Starting in the 1960' s with Miller and Stokes , political scientists have been
working to study how constituent preferences influence Congressional voting patterns . In
a refinement of their work, Robert Erikson found that constituent preferences played an
even larger role than previously predicted in influencing their representatives . He also
sought to clarify whether or not a representative is more likely than the loser in an
election to vote with the electorate because they are selected from within the electorate.
The alternati ve is that they were selected because their views are more congruent with the
constituency 's, and thus they were selected , notwithstanding their previous voting block.
Erikson reached the conclusion that while elected officials can be more effective
representatives because they are selected from the constituency , the constituency will
often exert more control over the representative by their electoral behavior , and by
selecting officials that represent their preferences . (Erikson 1978)
Building on this theory , Joshua Clinton sought to understand partisan differences
in how elected officials - specifically House Members - represent their constituents . He
also looked at different sub-constituencies that could be represented , which he identified
as same-party constituents or nonsam e-party constituents. Overall , the different subconstituencies are not represented differently in a meaningful way . But when you look at
how each party responds to sub-constituencies , there are important differences. The
Republicans, who were the majority party for the Congress that was studied , were more
responsive to same-party constituencies , while Democrats were more responsive to
nonsame-party constituencies . Because this was not over an extended period of time, it is
difficult to say whether these differences were because of party or majority status, but
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they do provide significant insight into sub-constituencies , and how these groups may
influence voting patterns for those selected to represent certain areas. (Clinton 2006)
One of the most widely acknowledged theories ofrepresentation is the median
voter theorem (Downs 1957). This theory predicts that legislators will vote according to
the preferences of the ideological median among voters in their district , in order to
maximize the number of constituents they are appealing to, and increase their electoral
success. This is because the median voter's preferences are closer to all other voters '
preferences than any other single voter. There are variations on this theory , such as the
idea that legislators represent the median voter in their constituency , but not necessarily
among their entire district (Levitt 1996). This i:rieansthat among the voters who elected
them, the median voter is represented. There are also some theories that directly
contradict the median voter theory, like the one proposed by Bafumi and Herron, called
Leapfrog Representation . This is defined as the trend of "when a congressional legislator
is replaced by a new member of the opposite party , one relative extremist is replaced by
an opposing extremist." This theory holds that the median voter is altogether skipped
over each time a new representative is elected , and is minimally represented . At the same
time, extreme views are over represented , creating backlash from the opposing party ,
which causes an electoral swing to the other extreme. (Bafumi and Herron 2010)
On an even more fundamental level, there is a theoretical basis suggesting that
individuals interpret their role of representative differently. Some legislators act as
delegates, directly representing the will of the people. Some choose to act as a trustee ,
acting in what they believe to be the best interest of those they represent. Finally , there is
a cohort called politicos who fluctuate between the aforementioned styles of
representation . (Gross 1978) The style an individual takes to represent their constituency
is a key factor in understanding how the public is represented at large.
There are practical challenges to representation as well. Published in American
Economic Review , Steven Levitt attempts to break down what factors influence how a
Senator votes. He argues that personal ideology is one of the most important
considerations a Senator makes when deciding how to cast a vote. He also makes the
point that support constituency plays a more important role than the median voter. One
final important result he highlights is that legislators become more sensitive to voter
preference as elections draw closer. (Levitt 1996) While this study uses a more economic
approach, and several of the points he makes are contested, it highlights the fact that
representation is not a simple task, and is variable across time and between legislators.
Levitt also highlights the importance of a voting constituency in representation , and how
partisans , or partisan-leaners may play an important role in influencing legislators.
The major issue that representatives and voters face when making public policy
decisions in a representative government is communication (Gastil and Black 2007).
Legislators must be able to effectively communicate their views and the policy decisions
they make to voters in order to campaign effectively . It is also imperative that they
understand their voters ' preferences in order to legislate accordingly. Voters hold their
legislators accountable for their voting behavior (Grynaviski 2010). When a
representative is seeking reelection, they must be able to show their constituents that they
are effectively representing them '. whether that is by voting according to the constituents'
preferences as a delegate , or by successfully communicating that they are voting in the
best interest of the constituents as a trustee. However , a major inhibitor to understanding
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voter preferences is diversity among the constituency.
Diversity can be demographic or ideological , and Bishin et al. found that both
types of diversity influence the ability ofrepresentatives to understand voter preferences .
While all senatorial candidates show some responsiveness to voter preferences , Bishin
found that it is much more common among individuals in states with demographic and
ideological homogeneity. In fact, they found that, "Citizens in homogenous states seem to
obtain the same representational benefits as do those living in House Districts designed to
maximize descriptive representation of a particular racial or ethnic minority group ."
(Bishin, Dow and Adams 2006) These results are noteworthy. It is extremely significant
that some states naturally have the same level of ideological homogeneity such that they
are being represented at the same level as a House district that is meant to maximize
representation. Similar results were found in other studies , although for most studies , the
main variable studied is ideological heterogeneity. In a study done by Gerber and Lewis,
it was found that in ideological heterogeneous district s, representatives are less
constrained by the median voter , and vote more frequently with their party (Gerber and
Lewis 2004) . In another study regarding ideological heterogeneity , Harden and Carsey
argue that in heterogeneous states , Senators attempt to balance constituent and party
pressures (Harden and Carsey 2012). This differs from most of the other literature
because they argue that in heterogeneous states , diversity is a balancing mechanism,
rather than a weakening influence on constituent representation . They , too, found that the
median voter has little impact on Senators from heterogeneous states, while party
influences exert a much stronger role.
My study will look at responses to ideology through the lens of party loyalty. The
American two party system is very unique , and has critical electoral and legislative
impacts. In 2010 , Jamie Carson , along with several others , published an article studying
how party unity voting affected electoral outcomes for incumbent Congressmen. Using
both experimental data , and data from the House of Representatives , they found that
voters punish Congressmen in general elections for being too partisan , by voting for them
less frequently . However , Congressmen are not punished for being too ideologically
extreme . (Carson , et al. 2010) This suggests the American public is unsupportive of overt
partisanship . However, in response to this article , Nicholas Pyeatt did a study on how
partisanship influences primary election results for incumbent Congressmen and found
that more partisan members of Congress were less likely to face a primary challenger ,
and more likely to receive a higher percentage of the vote share . He also found that more
ideologically extreme members of Congress were more likely to have a primary
challenger. Primary voters , who are typically more politically active, but a smaller
portion of the population , seem to reward partisan behavior. (Pyeatt 2015) The results of
these studies have remarkable implications for Congressmen. They must walk a fine line
of partisanship , and know their constituency well enough to know how to balance their
partisanship. In some states, the primary elections are far more competitive than the
general election , and in others the general election is the more competitive election
(Turner 1953). It is also noteworthy that partisanship has increased in recent history .
This could be related to an increase in primary elections rather than convention
nominations , or it could be a result of other historical trends and electoral outcomes in
modern history .
Partisanship and party loyalty are not static variables that are only influenced by
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electoral odds for each Congressman . At a macro-level , party realignment between the
1950s through the 1980s had a significant impact on party loyalty in Congress, as the
parties became more ideologically similar through a process of sorting , and thus
Congressmen voted with their party more frequently (Brewer and Stonecash 2009) . On a
more micro-level , Volden and Bergman found that party cohesion is strongly influenced
by majority or minority status, the cohesion of the other party , and shifts in the median in
the Senate , and varies each Congress. (Volden and Bergman 2006) Indeed, other studies
as well have found that party unity voting on an individual level is very strategic. Both
moderates and extremists at various times will use disloyalty to gamer support from their
constituencies (Slapin and Kirkland 2014) , but ideological extremists are more likely to
vote with their party when party leaders are seeking votes (Minozzi and Volden 2013).
Although party members can be cohesive while representing the states in
Congress, a defining feature of American government is federalism, allowing for fifty
unique States. This, in tum , creates unique differences at a state level between the major
political parties. These differences can stem from policies of the state, such as campaign
finance laws or voter registration laws. State culture can also play a major role in creating
differences between the same parties in different states . One more important factor is how
the party itself is organized and run in each state . Each state party makes decisions about
organizational structure, electoral strategies , and nominating mechanisms, such as
caucuses , closed primaries , or open primary elections. These factors that influence the
state party, and the state party itself likely have an impact on party ideological
heterogeneity in each state. (Gray and Hanson 2004)
Hypotheses and Methods
While there are several studies on ideological heterogeneity , few focus on the
effects that has on party loyalty among legislators , although party loyalty and polarization
are increasingly relevant topics . I will study how state ideological heterogeneity
influences Senators' party unity voting . The main topic of study will most likely result in
one of two outcomes. First we could observe that Senators from states that are more
ideologically heterogeneous will vote more frequently with their party , while Senators
from states that are ideologically homogenous will have lower party unity scores. This
reflects the theory that in homogenous states, legislators are better able to receive cues
from voters on their preferences and it is simpler to maximize benefits , while in
heterogeneous states , legislators have a more difficult time deciphering voter preferences ,
and thus take cues or give in to pressure from their respective parties , because they
cannot maximize benefits to their constituency. Though the aforementioned hypothesis is
commonly accepted , the reasonable alternative is that Senators from more homogenous
states will vote more frequently with their party because , except in rare cases , states have
partisan preferences. Thus, a homogenous population would belong to the same party and
Senators would choose to represent that party . In this case, Senators from heterogeneous
states may have lower party unity scores because they are making a conscious effort to
represent a more ideologically diverse population . I will make these observations about
the differences in party unity voting as influenced by state ideological heterogeneity in
the context of comparing results from Senators belonging to the Democratic and
Republican parties. I will also examine how state party ideology and ideological
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heterogeneity influences party unity. The hypothesis in these cases would be similar . It
may be that Senators from homogeneous state parties will vote less frequently with the
party in the Senate because they can take cues from their unique party in their state. It
could also be the case that Senators from states with homogenous state parties have
higher party unity scores because their state party has clear preferences that are likely in
line with the national party sentiment. Both outcomes seem equally possible because the
research on this specific topic is so sparse .
State ideology and ideological heterogeneity are the independent variables in this
study, and are central to understanding the ideological attitudes in each state. In this field
of study, these variables have been measured in a variety of ways . Presidential vote
percent by state has been used as a measure, but this is a fairly unspecific measure and
may measure state partisanship and mood more so than ideology (Carson, et al. 2010).
Another measure has been policy mood polling, but polling and sampling varies state to
state , making it a poor measure when using it as a comparison between states (Harden
and Carsey 2012). Ross, Cann, and Burt established the method I used in this study, and
similar methods have been used in other studies. This method uses data from the
nationally distributed The Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). The
ideology data comes from aggregating data from the CCES in the years 2009, 2010 ,
2011 , 2012 , and 2014. The questions used covered a range of issues including abortion ,
taxes, the War in Afghanistan , and other major issues in current politics. Individual
ideology scores were calculated, and after those calculations, both the average ideology
for the self-identified Republicans and Democrats were calculated and the average
ideology for the entire state . These are the state ideology scores , and represent general
political leanings of the state. The scores range from about -1 to 1, with negative numbers
being liberal , and positive numbers being conservative. The standard deviations for these
groups and sub-groups were also calculated, as a measure of dispersion is extremely
important for this study- this is the ideological heterogeneity variable. For example, two
states could both be considered moderate on average , but one of those states could be
homogenously moderate , while another state could be could be heterogeneously
moderate , meaning that there is a wide dispersion of ideologies in the state. Individuals
were considered Republicans if on the survey they reported being a "Strong Republican,"
"Weak Republican," or "Leaning Republican." They were classified as a Democrat if
they reported being a "Strong Democrat ," "Weak Democrat," or "Leaning Democrat."
The dependent variable for this study is party unity scores of individual Senators.
Annually , Congressional Quarterly publishes party unity scores for each individual
Senator. These scores are the percentage of times a member voted in agreement with their
party. They are based on votes cast, and so not voting does not influence a member's
party unity score . I used data from the years 2007-2016 . While there has been some
criticism of party unity as an effective measure of partisanship , overall it has been used
by many scholars to measure party loyalty without maj or issue (Krehbiel 2000). Part of
its strength comes from the fact that voting is the primary data source from each Senator ,
and it is a relatively unambiguous source when interpreting for meaning, because it is a
strong indicator of each Senator's preference. It can reflect a Senator's willingness and
electoral freedom to buck their party , or a strong commitment to a certain party's values
and goals.
To test the hypothesis, I ran multivariate regression models on the data , for
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Republican and Democratic Senators . I ran different models by party because of the
nature of the ideological heterogeneity data , and to make comparisons between
Republicans and Democrats . In order to gain the most accurate representation possible, I
used a number of control variables in my analysis . I will briefly explain each of those
variables and their importance . Later , I will also discuss the partisan results in the context
of these variables.
Incumbent Senators ' State Party Ideology : This variable is the state party
ideology for senators of the same party. For example , in my regression model for
Democratic Senators , this is the Ideology score of those considered Democrats in each of
their states . This prevents a bias due to party strength in the data , and also allows for
analysis of how state party ideology influences party loyalty in the Senate .
Incumbent Senators' State Party Ideological Heterogeneity : This variable is very
similar to the previous variable, except rather than being an average ideology score, it is
the standard deviation, or a measure of variance. This signifies the level of differences
within the party , and how diverse the party is. It gives an idea of how ideological
heterogeneity within a party may influence party unity voting.
Party Leadership : This variable is used as an indicator for whether or not each
Senator belongs to the Party's leadership . I have defined being in a leadership position as
being a Majority/Minority Leader, Whip , Caucus Leader , Conference Chair, or
Conference Secretary. Previous research by Harden and Carsey has shown that being in a
party leadership position results in a higher likelihood to vote with the party , and thus
making it an important control variable when measuring party unity (Harden and Carsey
2012).
Primary Election Margin of Victory : This variable is a numerical value
representing the difference between the winning candidate's and the next closest
candidate's vote percentage for Senators in the primary election previous to each year the
data is gathered for. As was previously mentioned , partisan voting behavior is rewarded
in primary elections , and it may be possible that Senators who faced close primary
elections will display more partisan behavior following the election (Pyeatt 2015) .
General Election Margin of Victory: Similar to the preceding variable , this is a
number that is the difference between the winning candidate's and the next highest vote
getter ' s percentage , from the election prior to the year of the data being collected.
Research shows that legislators who vote more frequently with their party often receive a
smaller vote share than those who vote less frequently with their party (Carson , et al.
2010). It may be the case that Senators who have small reelection margins will vote less
frequently with their party in order to prevent punishment at the polls by voters .
Prima ry Election Margin of Victory Squared: This variable is the squared value
of the winning candidate's primary vote percentage . This is particularly important
because some of those who advanced in the primaries actually lost on the first ballot, so
this ensures all numbers are positive. It also highlights the effect by creating larger
values .
General Election Margin of Victory Squar ed: This represents the squared value
for the margin of victory in the general election for the winning candidates . Although
there were no negative results for the general election , this is again an important variable
because it displays a much clearer view of the results because they are exponentially
larger.

7

Results
The results of this study differed significantly between the two major political
parties , and have major implications for this field of study. In this section , I will discuss
how Democrats ' and Republicans' party unity was affected by their state ideology and
ideological heterogeneity , and the noteworthy role other variables may have played in
party unity for these groups.
T abl e 1 : Summarv D aa
t
Variable

Mean

Party Unity Scores

Minimum

Maximum

90.86

Standard
Deviation
10.29

38

100

State Ideology Scores

0.06

0.22

-0.45

0.44

State Ideological Heterogeneity Scores

1.28

0.05

1.21

1.46

State Democratic Party Ideology Scores

-0.91

0.18

-1.27

-0.47

State Democratic Party Ideological
Heterogeneity Scores
State Republican Party Ideology Scores

0.94

0.04

.0.86

1.04

1.10

0.11

0.82

1.26

Republican Party State Ideological State
Heterogeneity Scores
Primary Election Margin of Victory

0.87

0.03

0.81

0.94

70.21

33.25

-10.47

100

General Election Margin of Victory

23.21

17.82

0.01

100

I will begin my analysis by looking at the results for the Democratic Senators.
During the time period that I studied, Democrats were a Senate majority for eight of the
ten years. When looking at the state ideology measure , which measures the liberalness or
conservativeness of the state's population , there appears to be a negative correlation, with
the correlation coefficient being -16.96. This means that when a state's ideology score
drops by one point, thus the average ideology is leaning strongly liberal , a Senator ' s party
unity score will increase by about 17 points. However , here it is important to note the
summary data on Table 1. One standard deviation for state ideology is only about 0.22 , so
the typical changes in party unity scores for most of these Senators is less than 4 points.
That being said, this variable does reach a level of statistical significance at the 95%
confidence interval. As a state becomes more ideologically liberal, Democratic Senators
from that state will vote with their state more , while Democratic Senators from more
ideologically moderate, or in rare cases conservative , states will vote less frequently with
their party.
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Table 2: Democratic Senators' Results
Regression Table for Democratic Senators
Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

t-value

P>t

State Ideology*

-16.96

3.68

-4.61

0.000

State Ideological Heterogeneity

7.35

10.70

0.69

0.492

Democratic Party State Ideology

-0.77

5.51

-0.14

0.888·

Democratic Party State Ideological State
Heterogeneity

-18.50

9.46

-1.96

0.051

Leadership

1.77

1.16

1.52

0.128

Primary Election Margin of Victory

-0.27

0.05

-0.57

0.571

General Election Margin of Victory

0.10

0.08

1.28

0.201

Primary Margin of Victory Squared

0.0002

0.0004

0.58

0.561

General Election Margin of Victory
Squared

-0.0015

0.0014

-1.06

0.289

Constant
99.41
10.19
9.75
0.000
*Denotes Variables that reach a level of statistical significance at P>0 .05 or greater .
Democrats showed a slight positive relationship between party unity voting and
state ideological heterogeneity, but this did not reach a level of statistical significance.
This has some important implications, not the least of which is that while Democrats are
highly attentive to the overall ideological position of their state population , they do not
appear to be affected by the level of diversity within the state. This could lead to a
Senator from a state where the general population is moderately liberal voting in the
exact same way as a Senator from a state that is moderately liberal because there are
some very liberal individuals and some moderate or conservative individuals.
There was also only a very slight effect of the Democratic Party Ideology on party
unity voting for Democratic Senators , and it did not reach a level of statistical
significance. These findings imply that Democratic Senators place more value on the
ideological views of the state population as a whole, rather than just those who identify
with their party . Another valuable finding is that Democratic Party Ideological
Heterogeneity has a negative relationship with party unity scores. As each state's
Democratic Party becomes more homogeneous (their scores decrease) party unity voting
will increase . A one-point decrease in heterogeneity is associated with about an 18-point
increase in party unity voting. Again , it is important to look at the standard deviation for
this independent variable on Table 1, which is about 0.044. One standard deviation
change results in a less than one point change in party unity scores, because the variation
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in Democratic Party Ideological Heterogeneity is so small. The level of significance for
this variable is also important to note. The relationship is significant at a 94.9%
confidence level. This does not reach the typical standard of significance in the field of
political science. Yet to deny that there is any effect when the level of significance is so
close to the threshold of 95% confidence would be unwise. So while this variable does
not in fact, meet the normal standard of confidence, it does appear to have some effect on
party unity voting and further research should be done to examine this relationship.
Senators with leadership roles may have been more likely to vote with their party
than those who were not in leadership positions in the Senate, but the effect is slight, and
does not reach a level of statistical significance. This may suggest that Senators feel most
of their obligation to their state, and that being in a position of power does little to shift
their priorities. However, these findings conflict with previous research and more study is
necessary to reach a conclusion.
The variables Primary Election Margin of Victory and General Election Margin
of Victory have some interesting implications, and will be discussed in direct comparison
to the Republican results, where they can be presented with more clarity, following the
overall discussion of the Republican Senators' results.
The results for the Republican Senators differed significantly from the Democrats.
As Republican Senator's states became more ideologically conservative, the Senator's
are more likely to vote more frequently with their party. This is a positive correlation,
because as a state becomes more conservative their ideology score becomes a higher,
positive score. The coefficient is 41.56 for Republican Senators, meaning, as a state
becomes one point more ideologically conservative, party unity scores will increase by
more than 41 points. Because the standard deviation for state ideology is only about .22,
the typical change in party unity scores is about 9 points for Republicans. This effect does
reach a level of statistical significance at a 95% confidence level, and the effect is about
twice as large for Republicans as it is for Democrats. These results indicate that
Republicans may be more responsive to changes in ideology among their constituents
than their Democratic counterparts . A change in ideology would only need to be half as
significant for a Republican Senator to adjust their party unity voting compared to a
Democrat.
State ideological heterogeneity also had a statistically significant impact on party
unity voting for Senators. These two variables had a negative relationship, such that as a
state became more ideologically diverse, party unity voting decreased among Republican
senators. The correlation coefficient is -58.38, for every one point increase in state
ideological heterogeneity. But again, it is important to look at the standard deviation of
these variables to determine the real effect that we are seeing. The standard deviation for
state ideological heterogeneity is 0.055, so when most of the Republican Senators' states
become more ideologically diverse, their party unity scores change only about 3 points.
While this seems like a much smaller impact, it is still important to note that it did reach a
confidence level above 95%. Republicans appear to be aware of the ideological diversity
in their states, and voting patterns differ accordingly.
Republican Senators had a very small positive response to changes in the ideology
of the state Republican Parties. The effect was minor and was not statistically significant.
Similarly, Republican Senators had a slight positive response to changes in ideological
heterogeneity within their party, but this too did not reach a level of 95% confidence.
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T able 3 : R epu blican Sena tors 'R esu Its
Regression Table for Republican Senators
Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

t-value

P>t

State Ideology*

41.56

6.04

6.88

0.000

State Ideological Heterogeneity*

-58.38

15.29

-3.82

0.000

State Republican Party Ideology

7.69

12.77

0.60

0.547

State Republican Party Ideological
Heterogeneity

25.35

21.94

1.16

0.249

Leadership

2.45

1.63

1.50

0.134

Primary Election Margin of Victory

0.11

0.06

1.96

0.051

General Election Margin of Victory*

-0.20

0.08

2.61

0.009

Primary Margin of Victory Squared

-0.0009

0.0005

-1.72

0.086

General Election Margin of Victory
Squared

0.0013

0.0008

1.58

0.115

Constant
125.64
20.52
6.12
0.000
* Denotes Variables that reach a level of statistical significance at P>0.05 or greater.

It seems , at least from 2007-2016 , that while Republicans seem more attuned to the
policy mood and ideological diversity of the state as a whole , they are either unaware of,
or apathetic to changes in their state parties' ideological position . Contrastingly ,
Democrats are more aware of diversity among their party members , but may not be as
aware of the state as a whole .
Senate Republicans also had a very slight increase in party unity voting when they
were in a leadership position, but this change did not reach a level of statistical
significance. As was the case for the Democratic Senators, leadership seemed to play a
minor role in party unity voting in this study, especially when controlling for state
ideology . This could be because ultimately Senators feel more obligations to their state
than party, or because party leaders may be selected from states with strong ideological
preferences and homogeneity , so party unity voting is unaffected.
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Primary and General Election Variable Results
As was previously mentioned , the results regarding party unity voting among
Senators and the two election variables are particularly interesting because of the
especially important nature of these variables . While the main purpose of this study is not
to examine how election outcomes influence party unity voting in the U .S. Senate , to
simply ignore the results that became available would be a waste of valuable information
about election impacts on legislating , and differences between our two major parties.
Elections are a huge part of American politics and culture , and examining election
outcomes and the relationship between major political institutions can provide greater
insight into each of these parts of American government.
Primary elections are much more party-centered , and the results seem to vary a
great deal more, with some people losing the primary election , yet still receiving their
party's nomination or winning the general election. This resulted in negative margins of
victory for some individuals , which made the analysis slightly more difficult. This was
one reason for creating a Primary Margin of Victory Squared variable - to nullify the
negative results .
For Democratic Senators, as their primary margin of victory increases , their party
unity scores decrease . Yet this effect is minute , and does not reach a level of statistical
significance. For Republican Senators , there is a positive relationship between primary
election margin of victory and party unity score , meaning as the margin of victory
increases , so will party unity score. The coefficient for this variable is 0.1146 , but to put
it into context , the average standard deviation for primary election margin of victory is
about 33 points , so most Senators ' party unity scores will be influenced by about 3
points . This reached a level of significance at the 94.9 % confidence interval , so while it
was not statistically significant at the accepted level for the field , to discount a
relationship between party unity scores and primary election victory margins for
Republicans would be discarding what could be a valuable relationship . Neither party had
statistically significant results for the Primary Margin of Victory Squared variable .
Graphs 1 and 2 give a clearer display of the actual effect we are seeing because of
this variable. Holding all the other variables constant , pred icted party unity scores are
calculated for each member based on their margin of victory in their primary election.
For members of the Democratic Party , party unity scores are highest when the margin of
victory is low , and as margin of victory increases party unity scores decrease . After
reaching a low point at about 60 points, party unity scores begin to ascend again as the
victory margin increases . It is very important to reiterate that this effect did not reach a
level of statistical significance, and that the effect is very minor. While there is a visible
trend on the graph , the changes are so small that they would be almost indiscernible in
comparison to real party unity scores . However , this is an important unit for comparison
between parties , and it provides valuable insight into the quadratic relationship that we
would otherwise be unable to see. Before discussing any implications these results may
have , I will also discuss the general election results to give a clear picture of what is
taking place .
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For Republican Senators , the graph of their pr edicted party unity scores and
primary margin of victories are near opposite results as the Democrats. Party unity began
low with those whose margins of victories were very low. It then increased as the victory
margins increased , peaking between a 60 and 70 point win . However , those who truly
swept the competition , or were uncontested, showed lower levels of party unity voting
than some of their counterparts. These results are statistically significant.
General elections have significantly more part icipation , as well as a much more
diverse set of individuals participating in them . Generally , the results were less dispersed
than they were for primary elections . For Democrats , the General Election Margin of
Victory variable had a slightly positive relationship, but was not statistically significant.
The General Election Margin of Victory Squared variable had a very small negative
relationship, but was also not statistically significant. This suggests that there is likely no
relationship between a Democratic Senator's party unity score and the margin of victory
by which they won their election . On the other hand , Republicans had a negative
relationship between party unity and general election margin of victory. This means that
these Senators were less unified with their party when they won their general election by
a larger percent of the vote . The opposite is also true. This did reach a level of statistical
significance at the 95% confidence level. The coefficient was -0.1975, and the standard
deviation for general election margin of victories was 17.8 points , so most Senator's
scores would only fall about 3 points as their election margin increased. The General
Election Margin of Victory squared variable did not reach statistical significance for
Republican Senators.
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Graph 2
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Graphs 3 and 4 again provide more insight into the trends we see for the
Democratic and Republican Senators in regards to their party unity scores and their
general election margin of victory. Graph 3 shows the predicted party unity scores for
Democrats based on their general election results. Keeping in mind that these results are
not statistically significant, we can see that as the margin of victory for Democratic
Senators increases, they are more likely to vote with their party, with a peak just above a
victory margin of 30 points. After reaching that point, party unity scores tend to decrease
as the victory margin increases. The difference in party unity scores is almost
indiscernible for Democratic Senators, and none in this group won by more than 60
points, so this trend line gives a bit more detail into what we may see, but can't be used
for any definitive statements or predictions .
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Graph 3
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Republicans had an opposite response as Democrats to the results of their general
election margins of victory . Graph 4 displays the anticipated party unity score based on
the general election margin of victory for the Republican Senators. Those competing in
the closest elections seemed to have the highest party unity scores , beginning at about 85
points . Then as elections become less competitive, Republicans display less party unity,
with those who had a victory margin of about 73 points having a party unity score of less
than 78 points. There is a slight uptick for those with extremely high margins of victory
who are Republicans. These results were statistically significant , and the range of scores
is much greater for Republicans than it was for the Democrats .
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Interpreting the Differences
As we have seen, Senators from each of the major political parties in the United
States responded in very diverse ways to the variables that were observed in this study.
This section will not seek to understand why the parties reacted this way , but rather what
the differences were, and what the implications of these differences and all the results are
for the study of the U.S. Senate .
State ideology is a key part of federalism and research in this field, and Senators
seemed to react differently to changes in this variable depending on their partisanship . As
was discussed in detail earlier , Democrats and Republicans both seemed to vote more
frequently with their party when their states became more ideologically extreme ,
although it was not statistically significant for the Democratic Senators. So while the
relationship is inconclusive for the Democrats, it was evident that Republicans were
strongly influenced by the ideological viewpoints of their constituents. This variable
actually had the largest impact on their party unity scores . Based on these results , state
ideology is the largest factor in determining how a Republican Senator will vote, and
suggests that many representatives choose to work as a delegate , representing the will of
their constituents .
Ideological heterogeneity also suggests that Republicans are very sensitive to their
constituents ' views , and changes in them, while no conclusions can be drawn for the
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Democratic Senators . Republicans ' party unity scores would decrease as state ideological
heterogeneity increased . This is the second most important factor in predicting
Republicans' party unity scores. Why Republicans are more responsive to their entire
state's ideology is unclear , but for both of the state ideological variables , the Republicans
are significantly more likely to respond to constituent ideology , and make a direct effort
to represent the views of the citizens of their state . If this topic is explored further , we
may gain some valuable insights into the differences between parties.
Neither Democrats nor Republicans had statistically significant results when
regressing party ideology on party unity scores , and Democrats wer e just bordering
statistical significance for party ideological heterogeneity , while Republicans did not
show any strong effect. It is important that Democrats are responsive to diversity and
ideological shifts within their base , but it appears that neither party has strong reactions to
the ideology their party. This may suggest that because they have foundational support
they are less concerned with policy mood among their party loyalists , and are catering to
independent and swing voters . This would probably be in an effort to maximize votes ,
because strong partisans will likely support the party ' s nominee no matter what , but
independent voters and weak partisans may be more vulnerable . However , it is important
to be aware of changes in the party ' s ideological mood because it may have stronger
influences on primary elections that are becoming increasingly more competitive (Turner
1953).
Holding a leadership position in the Senate also had no significant impact on
party unity voting for members of either party. This conflicts with other research done on
this topic that states Congressional leadership votes with their party more frequently than
non-leadership members . More research is necessary to evaluate the true effect of holding
a leadership position on party unity voting for Senators. But the results from this study
could indicate that members from both parties feel greater obligations to their states than
their parties , even when in high-pressure roles where they are the party leaders .
Reelection is a high priority for Senators , and this could suggest that even party leaders
feel that reelection prospects are more important than party loyalty. The interpretation of
these results could also be much simpler. Party leaders may just be picked from
ideologically homogeneous states where the party is strongly represented , to ensure they
have high reelection chances and represent the party ideologically.
The margin of victory for primary elections did not appear to have a significant
effect on the party unity scores for Democrats , and while it didn 't meet the 95%
confidence interval threshold for Republicans , it reached a 94.9%, which is sizable
enough that it should not be dismissed. Republicans were more likely to vote with their
party when they had a greater margin of victory in their primary. We cannot infer
causality from this relationship, but there are a couple of things that could be taking
place. First , these results could imply that Republicans who are more partisan in their
voting patterns receive a greater share of the vote in their primary elections. Primary
elections are more partisan in nature , and as was noted , partisan behavior is rewarded in
primary elections (Pyeatt 2015) . Another related implication we can take from these
results is that those who receive a greater portion of the primary vote may choose to vote
more frequently with the party to reflect their voter ' s preferences , while those who have a
very small margin of victory may not feel as strong of a connection to their party and
may vote more with the diverse preferences in their states. These outcomes are not
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mutually exclusive and could be working together to make an impact on how Republican
Senators choose to vote . There may be a slight trend in the opposite direction for
Democrats, but because the effect is so small and not statistically significant , no
conclusions can be drawn . There is no clear inclination for how Democrats respond to
varying margins of victory in their primary elections . More research on this topic is
necessary to draw any definitive inferences about these results.
The general election margin of victory was also not statistically significant for
Democrats, but it was for members of the Republican Party. However, Republicans
reacted in the complete opposite way when it came to this variable . As the margin of
victory increased, party unity voting decreased for these Senators. However , these results
are consistent with the literature as well. Senators who vote more frequently with their
party could be punished in general elections for their partisan behavior by the more
diverse and independent voting population . Alternatively , Senators who are receiving a
greater portion of the vote share could feel less obligated to their party , or more obligated
to a heterogeneous _voting block who elected them, and could choose to vote less
frequently with the party because of these results . Again, it is not that these options are
one or the other - these factors could be working together to create the effect we observe.
But further research into the subject is necessary to gain proper insight into the subject.
Interestingly , Democrats again seem to react in the opposite manner , but there is only a
very slight effect that is not significant, so to make any conclusions would be
presumptuous.
Addressing the Hypothesis
In regards to the hypotheses , and possible outcomes , it seems that at least for
Republican Senators , the second hypothesis is true. As states became more ideologically
extreme, and homogenous party unity voting actually increased among this group. This is
contrary to the research that suggests that it is heterogeneity that actually increases party
unity scores, as Senators will take more cues from their party and feel less restrained by
their diverse constituency . On the other hand, Democrats did vote more frequently with
their party as their constituency became more extreme , but constituent homogeneity had
little impact on their voting patterns at all. This suggests that this group is attuned to
overall policy mood, but pays little heed to diversity of viewpoint within their state. Both
of these findings conflict with much of the current literature regarding the ideological
heterogeneity and party unity voting , and pro:vide avenues for future research that may
provide more insight into why there are such major differences between the parties.
Conclusion
Discerning patterns in voting is a key part of studying our law making institutions
here in the United States. Because parties play such a substantial role in American
politics, viewing voting patterns through the lens of party unity can give insight into the
influence each party has on its members. This is especially true as we investigate the
varying ideological viewpoints in each state. The U.S. federal system allows for states
with significant ideological differences and variance to elect their leaders which , I
hypothesized, would impact their voting patterns . For Republican Senators there was an
influence on party unity voting based on ideological extremity and heterogeneity . These
results have critical implications for this field of study. The Republicans responsiveness -
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and Democrats apparent non-responsiveness for most of the observed variables - to their
constituents and the diversity within their state could have strong influences on their
election outcomes . This may have been one of the major factors that made a difference
for Senator Murkowski as she ran - and won - her write-in campaign in a general
election . This could be the case for senators that because they are receptive in their voting
patterns , it is likely that they are also receptive in their campaigning . This could draw a
larger number of voters to them than would otherwise be anticipated. Currently more
people identify as Democrats than Republicans , yet Republicans have control of
Congress, the majority of gubernatorial positions , control of most state legislatures, and
the presidency (Jones 2017) . There are many factors that will influence this but the fact
that Republicans in the U.S. Senate are more influenced by state ideology may be one of
them. They are responding more frequently to voter preferences , and may be rewarded
electorally for that response.
Another implication of this research deals with the representation of individuals .
Individuals living in states represented by Republicans are more likely to have their
preferences catered to if the state is diverse . However , the voting margins in these
preferences is so small that the Senator will still most likely be voting with their party a
majority of the time . However , Democratic Senators show no reaction to changes in
ideology or diversity within each state. This is concerning for those being represented
because it suggests their voices may not be heard by their elected official. Even within
parties these results have interesting implications for voters. Active partisans often make
up a base of the voters who vote in primaries, donate to campaigns , and volunteer for
campaigns (Saunders and Abramowitz 2004) . Yet neither Democrats nor Republicans
had strong responses to the ideology of their state party , and Democrats may have had a
slightly significant response to ideological heterogeneity within their party but
Republicans did not. The voters who are exceptionally active in supporting their party ,
especially early on in the election cycle, may not be receiving many benefits because of
the apparent indifference of Senators to the ideology of their state political parties. Most
elections have much more predicable outcomes than the 2010 election in Alaska , but that
doesn't mean that electoral outcomes, or subsequent voting patterns based on the
population of the state are straightforward. Elected officials have many demands upon
them, including several groups they are called upon to represent. This deeper insight into
how electoral factors, as well as factors related to state ideology, ideological
heterogeneity, and sub-constituency ideology can, however , aid scientists, strategists , and
the voting public in understanding the legislative decision making process of their
Senators .
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Reflective Writing
A capstone is a finishing stone added to a wan or arch in order to complete it.
Completing my honors capstone has been one of the most challenging yet rewarding
experiences of my undergraduate career. As I began working on it more than a year ago, I
had the challenge to decide how tackle this opportunity, and if it was something I would
consider worth it. Looking back, I can easily say that is was , for innumerable reasons. I'll
go into detail about just a few to explain how I have grown through this process , and how
I really view it as a "capstone" to my education.
First of an , completing this thesis reany anowed me tie together my education in a
way that I think few things could . As a dual major in Political Science and Economics,
which are housed in different colleges, there is little overlap in material that I am
learning , although the concepts are inseparable . Writing a thesis allowed me to apply
economic concepts , models, and statistical practices to my passion for studying
legislative politics. It also allowed me to practice the statistical skills I had learned in both
disciplines , as well as the analytical skills I have worked on through my undergraduate
career. Writing a thesis was one of the closest things I got to real world experience in the
field of policy analysis. This has been wonderful as I prepare for more education and to
eventually enter the workforce.
Another significant benefit to writing my honors thesis was the relationship I
developed with my mentor , Dr. Damon Cann. I have worked with him for three years, but
as I began to work more independently on this project, I began to learn even more from
him. Not only did he consistently teach me about how to run statistical models , how to
write for a research audience, and how to present findings in a way that are
understandable, but he taught me important lessons about character and teaching itself
He pushed me to be more than I thought I could, because he saw potential in me that I
could not see. This meant stepping back even when I thought I was drowning in the work.
Dr. Cann taught me that being on someone's side means helping them to achieve all their
goals, even when it is hard. He also taught me that being a good mentor, and professor,
includes patience, kindness, and ways of boosting confidence . I think learning to be a
good person is just as useful in higher education as the academic skills you learn. What
good are academics if you won't use them to help? Dr. Cann taught me more than anyone
I know at Utah State both in academic knowledge and in positive character . This
mentorship has been key to my education here at Utah State.
Another benefit that I had not anticipated from this project was how it taught me
about research within my field, and research in general. As an undergraduate researcher , I
felt that I had a good understanding of research - this is something that I have grown up
with and been working through for the past eight years ofmy life. Yet , completing a
project of this magnitude so independently taught me a great deal. I learned what a
process it can be. I changed my ideas multiple times as I researched, looked for data, and
did more background research. I then wrote and rewrote and rewrote again , trying to find
the best words to say what the numbers were actually saying. The process was so much
longer and more strenuous than I had imagined. I also learned how much research there is
in political science and in economics, and how interrelated they are. My subject was
highly specific, yet I still found related studies, and there were so many other specific
studies that I needed to understand to form my hypotheses . It was fascinating . Perhaps
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one of the most fun parts of this project was the discovery of information and
relationships I wasn't even looking for. The beauty ofresearch is that we often find
something valuable, even if it wasn't what we thought. I remember when that really
started to click, it was thrilling.
A project on state ideological heterogeneity and party unity voting in the United
States Senate doesn't seem very connected to the community or world around me. It is a
niche subject, and the Senate is one of the most elite governing bodies in the world. This
simply doesn't seem like it applies. But discovering how it did, and how it could be
important to people around me was enlightening . It was difficult at times - it takes mental
stretching . But when I realized that behind the numbers, behind the state heterogeneity
scores, and ideological units, and margins of victory , were real voters who cared about
issues, then it became much more real. I realized that although it seems obscure, there are
people who want to be represented, and it is important we know if and how that is being
done. That is the first step to making sure they are being represented in the best way
possible , and once we have this knowledge, we can connect people to their legislators,
and hold them accountable . They can decide, but they have to know first, and what I did
was start to help us know what is happening . I love being able to use my passion for
research to help people work effectively in their political system.
Overall , writing a capstone was difficult and there were times I didn't think it was
possible. I didn't think I could do it. But having done it, I can now say that it completed
my education in a unique way. I developed strong relationships, connected my varying
interests, gained a much deeper education on research, and found ways to help my
community. These are just some of the benefits . I learned that I can do hard things, and
that the results are so gratifying.
Final Word Count on Body of Thesis: 8,643
Final Word Count on Reflective Writing: 1,008
Total Word Count of Thesis: 10,573
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